We consider within the framework of the Mean Field Games theory a dynamic discrete choice model with social interactions, where a large number of agents/players are choosing between two alternatives while influenced by the group's behavior. We introduce the "Min-LQG" optimal control problem, a modified Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimal control problem that includes a minimum term in its final cost to capture the discrete choice phenomenon. We give an explicit solution of the Min-LQG problem and show that at each instant, the dynamic discrete choice model can be interpreted as a static discrete choice model where the cost of choosing one of the alternative includes an additional term that increases with the risk of being driven to the other alternative by the Wiener process. Finally, the mean field equations are given. The fixed point problem will be studied in a next version of this article.
with a utility function, which is the sum of two terms. The first is a deterministic function that depends on the attributes of the person making the choice and the related alternative, while the second is a random variable reflecting the unobservable factors that contribute to the individual's choice. Under a utility-maximizing behavior assumption, the individual's choice is described by a set of "choice probabilities", i.e., the probabilities of choosing each of the alternatives.
In some situations, the individuals' choices are considerably influenced by the social behavior.
For example, in schools, teenagers' decisions to smoke are affected by some personal factors, as well as their peers' behavior. To analyze this phenomenon, Brock and Durlauf introduced within the framework of static noncooperative game theory a discrete choice model with social interactions [4] , where a large number of players are choosing between two alternatives while being influenced by the average of the choices. The authors analyze the model using an approach similar to the Mean Field Games (MFG) methodology, and inspired by statistical mechanics.
Recently, we studied a dynamic discrete choice model with social interactions in [5] [6] [7] . In these articles, we introduce within the framework of the MFG theory a dynamic game involving a large number of players choosing between multiple destination points. The agents' dynamics are deterministic with random initial conditions. We show via the MFG approach that multiple approximate (epsilon) Nash equilibria may exist, each characterized by a vector describing the way the population splits between the alternatives. The strategies developed in these papers are open loop decentralized policies, in the sense that to make its choice of trajectory, an agent needs to know only its initial state and the initial distribution of the population.
In this paper, we consider the fully stochastic case where a large number of players moving according to a set of controlled diffusion processes should reach before a time T one of two predefined destination points. They must do so while influenced along the path by the average of the population and developing as little effort as possible. This formulation generalizes the classical static discrete choice models. In fact, while in the classical models an agent makes its choice once, in our model, it updates its choice continuously based on the observations and occurring events. For example, along the path to choose a mode of transportation, a person is exposed to unexpected events that can affect its decision, such as weather changes, car accidents, etc.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
i. We introduce and solve a modified version of the standard Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimal control problem, that we call the "Min-LQG" optimal control problem, where the final cost is replaced by a minimum of two distances to capture the discrete choice phenomenon.
ii. We show that at each instant, the dynamic discrete choice model (Min-LQG problem) can be interpreted as a static discrete choice model where the cost of choosing one of the alternatives includes an additional term that increases with the risk of being driven to the other alternative by the Wiener process.
iii. In contrast to [5] [6] [7] , we consider in this paper controlled diffusion processes and develop MFG-based decentralized closed-loop policies.
The MFG methodology that we follow in this paper was originally developed in a series of papers by Huang et al. [8] [9] [10] , and independently by Lions and Lasry [11] [12] [13] . It is a powerful technique to analyze dynamic games involving a large number of players interacting through the mass effect of the group. It starts by considering the limiting case (continuum of players) which can be described by two coupled partial differential equations (PDE), a Hamilton-Jacobi- Definition 1: Consider N agents, a set of strategy profiles S = S 1 × . . . × S N and, for each agent k, a cost function J k (u 1 , . . . , u N ), ∀(u 1 , . . . , u N ) ∈ S. A strategy profile (u * 1 , . . . , u * N ) ∈ S is called an ǫ−Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J k , if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that,
The mathematical model is presented in Section II. In Section III, we introduce and solve the Min-LQG optimal tracking problem. We give an explicit form of the generic agent's best response (Min-LQG optimal control law) and discuss its relation to the classical static discrete choice problems. In section IV, we introduce the Mean Field Games equations. The existence of a sustainable mass behavior will be studied in a next version of this article.
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II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We present in this section the dynamic discrete choice model with social interactions. We consider a dynamic noncooperative game involving a large number N of players with the following dynamics:
where a ∈ R, b ∈ R\{0}, σ > 0, and {w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are N independent standard Wiener processes on some probability space (Ω, F , P ). We assume that the initial conditions {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and also independent of
We denote by p 0 the probability density function of x i (0). The scalar x i (t) is the state of player i at time t and u i (t) its control input. Each player is associated with the following individual cost functional:
for i = 1, . . . , N, where r, T > 0 and q, M ≥ 0. Along the path, the running cost forces the players to remain close to the average of the populationx(t) = 1/N N i=1 x i (t) and to develop as little effort as possible. At time T , a player i should also be close to one the destination points p 1 ∈ R or p 2 ∈ R, otherwise it is strongly penalized by the final cost.
We define the set of admissible control laws as follows:
We define the set of admissible Markov policies:
If u ∈ L, then the stochastic differential equation (SDE) (1), with u i equal to u(t, x i ), has a unique strong solution. Moreover, u (t, x i (t, w)) ∈ U [14] .
April 28, 2016 DRAFT III. THE "MIN-LQG" OPTIMAL TRACKING PROBLEM AND THE GENERIC AGENT'S BEST RESPONSE Following the MFG approach, we start by assuming a continuum of agents for which one can ascribe an assumed given deterministic macroscopic behaviorx. In order to compute its best response tox, a generic agent solves the following optimal control problem that we call the "Min-LQG" optimal tracking problem:
To solve explicitly the Min-LQG optimal tracking problem, we start by considering the situation where a = q = 0. In this case, one can derive an explicit solution using a generalized Hopf-Cole transformation. We then show that this solution holds in the general case.
A. Case a = q = 0
When a and q are assumed to be zero, the optimal cost-to-go function V (t, x) corresponding to (5) satisfies the following HJB equation [14] :
To find an explicit solution, we transform (6) 
The function ψ(t, x) satisfies the following backward Heat Equation:
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where c = (p 1 + p 2 )/2, d = (p 2 − p 1 )/2, and for j = 1, 2,
Proof: The unique solution of (8) is [15] :
By expanding the integrands in (10) and completing the squares, we get for j = 1, 2,
Now, by implementing these new expressions of the integrands in (10) , and by making a change
, for j = 1, 2, we get (9).
In the following, we characterize the probabilities in (9) . It can be shown that the functions V j (t, x), for j = 1, 2, are the optimal cost-to-go of the following standard LQG optimal control problems:
We recall that the optimal control law of (11) has the following form:
Note that if M = 0, then the optimal control laws u (2) * (t) = 0. Hence, the corresponding optimal states at time t, x (j) * (t) for j = 1, 2, are equal to to x (j) (0) + σw (j) (t), for j = 1, 2. Therefore,
To generalize this result for any M ≥ 0, we define the optimal states corresponding to (12) as follows:
where x (j) (0) = x(0), for j = 1, 2. The process x 
Thus,
Similarly, one can show that
We summarize the above discussion in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2:
The HJB equation (6) has a unique solution
where V j , for j = 1, 2, are the optimal cost-to-go functions of the standard LQG optimal control problems (11) , and x (j) * , for j = 1, 2, are the corresponding optimal states. April 28, 2016 DRAFT
B. General Case
We now solve the general case, i.e. q ≥ 0 and a ∈ R. The optimal cost-to-go function of (5) satisfies the following HJB equation:
We define the following standard LQG optimal tracking problems:
for j = 1, 2, where
Problem (16) is the optimal control problem that solves a generic agent when p j is the only available alternative. We recall the optimal cost-to-go V j , optimal control law u (i) * and optimal state x (j) * of (16) [17] :
where Π, β j and δ j are the unique solutions oḟ
We define the following conditional probabilities:
We now state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3: The HJB equation (15) has a unique solution:
where V j and x (j) * , for j = 1, 2, are defined in (17) . Proof: The functions ψ (j) (t, x) = exp − b 2 σ 2 r V (j) (t, x) , for j = 1, 2, satisfy the following linear PDEs:
We define ψ(t,
, where V is given by (20). We have
Noting (21) and the identities ∂ψ (j) ∂x = − b 2 σ 2 r (Πx + β j ) ψ (j) , for j = 1, 2, one can show that ∂ψ ∂t
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and V (t, x) satisfies (15) . The uniqueness of the solution follows from the uniqueness of solutions to the uniform parabolic PDE (22) [15] .
Having solved the HJB equation related to the Min-LQG optimal control problem (5), we now prove the existence of a unique optimal control law. We define the following function:
Theorem 4: The following statements hold:
i. The function u * defined in (23) has on [0, T ) × R the following form:
ii. u * is an admissible Markov policy.
iii. u * (t, x * (t, w)) is the unique optimal control law of (5), where x * (t, w) is the unique strong solution of the SDE in (5) with u equal to u * (t, x).
Proof:
We start by proving the first point. The functions β j and δ j defined in (18) have the following explicit forms:
where α is defined in (19). We have
By replacing the expressions of β j and δ j in the expressions of ∂g j ∂x and exp − b 2 σ 2 r V j , for j = 1, 2, one can show that
Therefore, u * defined in (23) is equal to (24). We now prove the second point. In view of (24), the function ∂u * ∂x is continuous on [0, T ) × R. Therefore, the local Lipschitz condition holds. Moreover, for all (t,
Hence, the linear growth condition is satisfied and u * is an admissible Markov policy. As a result, sufficient conditions are reunited for the SDE defined in (5) and controlled by u * (t, x) to have unique strong solution. Finally, we prove the third point. We have for Lebesgue × P -a.e
for some K > 0. Moreover, V ∈ C 1,2 ([0, T ) × R) satisfies the HJB equation (15) . Hence, by a verification Theorem, for example [14, Theorem 4.3.1] , u * (t, x * (t, w)) is an optimal control of (5) . The uniqueness of the optimal policy follows from the uniqueness of the solution of (15) and the convexity with respect to u of the Hamiltonian H(x, p, u, t) = (ax+bu)p+ q 2 (x−x(t)) 2 + r 2 u 2 .
C. Relation to Static Discrete Choice Models
In this paragraph, we discuss the relation between the Min-LQG optimal control problem and the static discrete choice models. We start by recalling some facts about the static models. In the standard binary discrete choice models, a generic person chooses between two alternatives 1 and 2. The cost that pays this person when choosing an alternative j is defined as follows:
where k(j) is a deterministic function that depends on the personal attributes and alternative j, while ǫ is a random variable. When ǫ is distributed according to the extreme value distribution, then the probability that a generic person chooses an alternative j is [3] :
.
The Min-LQG optimal control law (24) can be written as follows:
whereṼ
is the expected cost that pays a generic agent if p j is the only available alternative. In this case, u (j) * (t, x) is the optimal policy. Now in the presence of two alternatives, the optimal policy at time t is given by (25), which can be interpreted as a mixed strategy of two pure strategies u 
Thus, at each time t ∈ [0, T ], the dynamic discrete choice problem can be viewed as static discrete choice problem, where the cost of choosing alternative p j has an additional term 
IV. MEAN FIELD EQUATIONS
In Section III, we assume a given macroscopic behaviorx and compute the generic agent's best response to it, which is given by (24). In the following, we write u * (t, x,x) instead of u * (t, x) to emphasize the dependence onx. We now seek a sustainable macroscopic behavior
x, in the sense that it is replicated by the mean of the agents under their best responses to it.
The generic agent's optimal state satisfies the following SDE:
dx * (t) = (ax * (t) + bu * (t, x * (t),x)) dt + σdw(t).
We denote by p(t, x) the probability density function of x * . Hence, a sustainable macroscopic behavior (if it exists) should satisfy the following system of equations:
∂ ∂t p(t, x) = − ∂ ∂x ((ax + bu * (t, x,x)) p(t, x)) + σ 2 2 ∂ 2 ∂x 2 p(t, x), p(0, .) = p 0
where u * (t, x,x) is defined in (24). The first equation is the Fokker-Planck equation corresponding to the SDE (27) and p(t, x) is the probability density function (assumed to exist) of a generic agent as a function of time, while the second expresses the fact that the population meanx is the mean of x * . We analyze in a forthcoming version of this article the existence of a fixed point pathx satisfying (28).
V. CONCLUSION
We study within the framework of the MFG theory a dynamic discrete choice model with social interactions. We introduce the Min-LQG optimal control problem and give an explicit form of the generic agent's best response (Min-LQG optimal control law). The Min-LQG problem can be interpreted at each time t as a static discrete choice model where the cost of choosing one of the alternatives has an additional term that increases with the risk of being driven by the Brownian motion to the other alternative. Finally, we give the Mean Field equations. The fixed point problem will be analyzed in a next version of this article.
